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Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately—by diverting funds intended for
development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality
and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid.”*
I.

Introduction
Argentina has recently been a hotbed of economical, social and political disagreement.

Once heralded as nation of rags to riches immigrants in Buenos Aires and spirited gauchos in the
wide-open Pampa, it has now been relegated to a global example of fiscal irresponsibility in
government and international lending.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a leading character in the unfolding Argentine
saga, has also come under harsh criticism from scholars who argue that its lending policies have
failed miserably to correct the economic conditions that it has sought to improve. Jeffery Sachs
himself has labeled the IMF as, “the typhoid Mary of emerging markets.”1
Though many valid explanations exist as to the cause of Argentina’s financial collapse,
without a doubt, a major reason is the corruption that has afflicted the nation’s, indeed many
nations’, institutions for decades. In Argentina alone, “the level of corruption that persists is
staggering in scope” and “involves enormous sums of money.”2
This paper focuses on curtailing the corruption inherent in the lending practices of the
IMF and, subsequently, preventing another economic disaster as has occurred in Argentina. In
fact, if it is at all to succeed in future attempts to restore a state’s monetary and fiscal standing,
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the IMF should incorporate language of the Accounting and Record-keeping provisions of the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act into its loan agreement policies, thereby conditioning its
loans upon transparency and good governance over borrowed funds.
Part I of this article introduces corruption and its affect on international lending. Part II
describes the IMF and its mandates, and illustrates its role in the recent economic problems in
Argentina. Part III outlines Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
and demonstrates its potential effectiveness in curbing corruption on an international scale. Part
IV concludes, as the paper begins, with the notion that the IMF will better serve its function as
international lender when it deals directly with the problem of corruption inherent in its loans.
Transparency International, in its 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks 133
countries according to how corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and
politicians, ranked Argentina 92.3 With this knowledge, the IMF poured funds into the country
throughout the 1990’s to the present. Not surprisingly, much of this money went not to the
planned economic austerity programs, but rather to the private coffers of many Argentine
politicians and officials.
In fact, in one provincial city, the Argentine mayor “built an office that resembled a
scaled-down presidential country house before being convicted in 2000 of misappropriating
public funds and threatening a former city official.”4 As a result of these practices, many in the
region feel that years of IMF assistance and economic liberalization have done little to alleviate
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poverty, and “have little trust in their leaders to carry out reforms without lining their own
pockets.”5 Even the most well-meaning of plans by the IMF have been undermined by
corruption.6
Consequently, the IMF should strive for accountability in not only its loans practices, but
also the borrowers’ use of funds for stated purposes. A key component of this is transparency.
“A regulation or law is to be transparent if the process and the effects of the regulation or law
can been seen through easily, just as one can see easily through a clean window.”7 Likewise, the
IMF would be wise to establish transparency in following the path of its funds to assure
successfully executed programs and, ultimately, to achieve its mandate.
II.

International Lending for Economic Development
International lending has increased in dollar amounts exponentially in recent years, with

the IMF at the forefront of this relatively new practice. Argentina serves as an example,
however, of international lending practices leading to economical, political, a social instability at
national levels.
A. The International Monetary Fund
The IMF was created when twenty-nine countries signed its Articles of Agreement on
December 27, 1945.8 It was established to promote international monetary cooperation,
exchange stability and orderly exchange arrangements, to foster economic growth and high
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levels of employment, and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease
balance of payments adjustment.9 Additionally, the IMF provides the machinery for consultation
and collaboration on international monetary problems.10
Headquartered in Washington D.C.,11 the IMF is a multilateral institution controlled by
the U.S. and other industrial countries, and originally set up to help member countries maintain
agreed exchange rates.12 The IMF uses its own conceived mechanisms to ensure stability in
international exchange rates. One such mechanism is surveillance. Surveillance entails
maintaining “a dialogue with its member countries on the national and international
consequences of their economic and financial policies.”13 These activities have instilled a
reputation of the IMF as a “global watchdog, suitably positioned to determine when and where a
financial crisis may occur.”14
In its modern existence, the IMF has used its mandate to infuse capital into troubled
economies, “thereby acting as a catalyst to restore private sector confidence in the system and
attract investment to the economy.”15 Indeed, the IMF in the last two decades has engaged in
several well-publicized bailouts, including those in Mexico, Thailand, South Korea, and
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Indonesia.16 During this period, the IMF has emerged as an international lender of last resort,
commanding very sizeable resources due to support from the G-7 countries.17
The IMF has also, in turn, leveraged its loans to achieve reforms, both macro and micro,
in debtor countries.18 It has imposed conditions on borrowing governments that have frequently
involved, inter alia, raising taxes and interest rates and cutting government bureaucracy and
social spending.19 This has been popularized by the term the “Washington consensus,” or a new
set of Western, economic dogmas focused on economic liberalization and characterized by
discredit of the state and praise of free markets.20
Additionally, as a creditor, the IMF has the power to insist that the applicant country
adopt institutional reform measures intended to eliminate corrupt practices that undermine
economic stability. 21 The recent bailouts in developing countries focused global attention on the
potential influence of the IMF in “promoting good governance in all its aspects, improving the
efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption.”22

As a

consequence, the IMF in 1997 implemented seemingly competent guidelines to promote public
sector transparency and accountability.23
16

George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.
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The guidelines were meant to improve efficiency and support sustained economic growth
by using a “more proactive approach in advocating policies” and actively pursuing "the
development of institutions and administrative systems that aim to eliminate the opportunity for
corruption [and] fraudulent activity in the management of public resources.”24 Furthermore, the
guidelines aim to achieve "an evenhanded treatment of governance issues in all member
countries,” “enhanced collaboration with other multilateral institutions, in particular the World
Bank” and an improved “use of complementary areas of expertise [among anti-corruption
initiatives].”25 With its 1997 guidelines, the IMF claims to have significant leverage in requiring
that developing nations seek to reduce internal corruption.26
Incidentally, the IMF policy of subjecting borrower nations to its conditions has sparked
debate between those who see a borrower country’s political institutions as unduly susceptible to
Western economic ideals, and others who believe that, “if the IMF did not lend, the government
would be unable to implement reforms.”27 In the end, however, there is little evidence that IMF
conditions, usually requiring contradictory fiscal and monetary policies, have worked.28 IMF
conditionality has been extended substantially beyond traditional macro policy with little proof
of success in reducing debt crisis.29
For instance, the Washington consensus assumes a “one size fits all” policy, which holds
that there is only one path for development, and only one way for a government to organize its

future costs for the budget and public financial institutions. Corrupt practices could also occur in other government
activities, including the regulation of private sector activities that do not have a direct impact on the budget or public
finances, such as ad hoc decisions made in relation to the regulation of foreign direct investment. Such practices
would be counter to the IMF’s general policy advice aimed at providing a level playing field to foster private sector
activity.
24
George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577.
25
Id. See also Guidelines, supra note 22.
26
George & Lacey, supra note 8, at 577
27
Scott & Wellons, supra note 12, at 1342.
28
Id.
29
Id.
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economy and society.30 As one commentator notes, “this approach is ethnocentric and
undermines other non-financial values, and as a result, there have been profound dislocations
around the world, as governments dismantle universal entitlements and social safety nets to fit
the IMF's very narrow conception of sound finance.”31 Likewise, in November 1998, the U.S.
Congress’ International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission, in considering the future
roles of international financial institutions, including most prominently the IMF, ruled in favor of
ending IMF long-term lending tied to policy conditions.32
B. Argentina and the IMF
“Argentina captured the title for the largest sovereign default when it defaulted on its
$141 billion external debt in late December 2001.”33 The default itself was a culmination of
years of failed, economic strategies and from what many saw as excessive influence from the
IMF.
In a now highly scrutinized decision, the Argentine government in 1991 adopted a
Currency Board, which fixed the peso equal to the U.S. dollar. 34 The government’s intent was
to make imports cheaper and to curb inflation, and the initial success of the program brought
much acclaim to the Argentine Ministry of the Economy. 35 The appreciation of the Peso,
however, placed exports and domestic producers at an immediate competitive disadvantage
against the inexpensive imports.36
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Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 Am. U.
Int'l L. Rev. 1571, 1644 (1999).
31
Id.
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Chairman, Allan Meltzer.
33
Id. at 1329.
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35
Paddock, supra note 12, at 155. “To the extent the Dollar crept upward in the 1990s in relation to other
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36
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In addition, having received substantial financial assistance from the IMF, the
government was obligated to make periodic repayments. In 1995, however, Argentina's
government recognized that its one-to-one peg to the dollar, as well as its new economic
liberalizations, had failed to generate sufficient capital to meet its repayment obligations.37 That
year, the government was forced to renegotiate its IMF loan agreement, which resulted in a
significant decline in the Argentine stock market and began a recurrent pattern “over the next six
years, where the government would deny the gravity of the situation only to capitulate and lose
face shortly thereafter.”38
What also followed was a series of new agreements with the IMF for repayment,
conditioned each instance with specific targets for economic reform.”39 Pressured by the IMF
and its member countries, notably the U.S., the Argentine government agreed to reform labor law
and the social security system, and to introduce competition in the energy and
telecommunications sectors.40
Consequently, Argentines from all segments of the economy, including business leaders,
economists, and trade union leaders, protested then President Carlos Menem's introduction of tax
increases and spending reductions.41 The government, nevertheless, seemed unable or unwilling
to fully comply with the new conditions, yet the IMF continued to make loans, due perhaps to
the institution’s unwillingness to abandon its failed project and its “expectation of an eventual
turnaround.”42

37
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By 1998, Argentines viewed the IMF's bailouts as carried out to protect the affluent,
whose bad investments were repaid with IMF loan money, and at the expense of the poor, who
ultimately absorbed the costs of “the austerity programs installed to pay for those loans.”43
Although the IMF countries were satisfied with the loan conditions, Argentine government
workers and the working class erected roadblocks to protest the still rising unemployment rate
and potential, further IMF austerity measures.44 The result at the time was one-third of the
Argentine population living below the poverty line and 14% unemployment, with mass protests
leading to one death and several injuries during anti-IMF riots.45
By late 2000, with Argentines already humbled by foreign criticism of their
circumstance, the IMF was planning new loans to the country in excess of $15 billion.46 Talks
on extra funding stalled, however, and it became evident to the IMF and its member countries
47

that it had “not assign[ed] systemic risk to the crisis.”

Then the collapse occurred. The government, in a panic to reserve currency, limited bank
depositors to Pesos 2,000 withdrawals a month from current accounts and froze withdrawals
from accounts in dollars altogether.48 The government also controlled transfers of funds out of
Argentina, reduced the interest payments on $45 billion of government bonds held by local
investors, made local banks roll over $360 million of Treasury bills, and seized assets of pension
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funds in order to avoid a formal default on public debt.49 By the end of 2002, an estimated 50%
of the population was below the official poverty level.50
The IMF was blamed immediately as contributing to the default.51 Many critics believe
that, in retrospect, “the IMF [was] too rigid in demanding policies that the government [could
not] accomplish,”52 while others hold that “the IMF was too lenient and let Argentina continually
ignore the loan conditions.” 53
Undoubtedly, though, a major cause of the collapse resulted from the steadfast tradition
of internal corruption amongst the region’s elites. Indeed, inadequate constraints were adopted
to curtail corruption, where in a nation like Argentina, “traditional distrust of the state led to
disrespect for the rule of law, resulting in corruption and tax evasion.”54 Even now, after the
collapse, the Argentine people share the burden of the new currency limits, while the wealthy
move funds out of the country.55
Moreover, graft grew more visibly than ever during the 1990’s as Argentina enjoyed a
huge surge in investment after embracing the IMF’s free market policies.56 Many economists
see graft as an underlying cause of Argentina’s financial catastrophe, which served as a drain on
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government coffers and contributed to Argentina’s chronic budget deficits, forcing the
government to keep borrowing until lenders finally cut Argentina off.57
In April 2003, Argentina elected Nestor Kirchner its new president, by default, with
many expecting the nation’s economic and financial woes to turn around.58 In the months since
the elections, IMF negotiations had resumed, “GNP was expected to grow 4% in 2003, inflation
was in the single digits, and the peso had risen 20% against the dollar in four months, forcing the
central bank to intervene.”59
President Kirchner’s priorities have been political legitimacy and economic growth, as
well as a firm stance against IMF repayment terms and endemic corruption.60 His attempts at
stamping out corruption, however, have come under considerable stress, partly because
Peronism, the party to which he belongs, lacks serious opposition, and is itself implicated in
corrupt financial practices.61 The President, at present shows no sign of giving in to corruption,
though some Argentines wonder whether the President really has the power to tackle his party’s
corrupt old guard. 62
But President Kirchner draws authority from his sky-high poll ratings, earned by
fulfilling his promises of being a crusading reformer.63 Meanwhile, the nation is slowly but
surely gaining confidence, with a majority of 53% to 41% saying opening the economy had been
a positive, notwithstanding the economic crisis .64
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III.

Preventing Corruption
“Corruption equals monopoly power plus discretion minus accountability.”65 Corruption

undoubtedly stems from the government's role in the economy, where the greater the discretion
of public officials within the state's regulatory framework, and the larger the scope of public
benefits available to them, the more discretion officials have in taking advantage those benefits.66
When they are not held accountable, corrupt public officials may cause a domestic economy to
experience enormous financial losses.67
In Argentina, public officials were able to use their discretion without any threat of
repercussion, as the lack of accountability and transparency in the government permitted their
practices of graft and corruption to continue undetected.68 Concurrently, the IMF attempted to
avoid any involvement with Argentina’s internal governance.

69

In the 1990s, however, “the IMF

realized that abstention was no longer a feasible approach to attaining their objectives.”70
Accordingly, the IMF must forcefully address issues of corruption if it is to have any
success in future financial assistance programs. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act presents
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a valid model for securing accountability in financial transactions, and its acceptance by other
international organizations demonstrates its adaptability to institutions like the IMF.
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in 1977 as part
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (“SEC”).71 The FCPA was a response to the heightened
notoriety of corruption of the day from the Nixon presidential scandal to the everyday practices
of bribery in foreign transactions. An admirable initiative creating criminal penalties for those
who corrupt foreign officials, critics argued that the United States was placed at an immediate,
competitive disadvantage with other international trading states in bidding for third party
business.72
This criticism resulted chiefly from the FCPA’s more popular provisions criminalizing
the bribery of foreign officials by U.S. corporations and individuals pursuing business in other
countries.73 The FCPA also, however, required that companies with publicly-traded stock meet
certain standards regarding their accounting practices, books and records, and internal controls.74
These accounting provisions were an attempt to address the broader problem of corporate
concealment of illicit transfer of funds, which businesses under SEC jurisdiction often had
disguised by means of improper accounting procedures.75 Although the language has been
clarified in the years since its inception, the corporate governance approach rooted in the
accounting provisions has remained a part of all subsequent legislation.76

71

15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (1977).
Heather Manweiller and Bryan Schwartz, Creating The Free Trade Area Of The Americas: A Proposal for an
Anti-Corruption Dimension to the FTAA, 1 Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L. 67 (2001). [hereinafter Manweiller &
Schwartz]
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The accounting provisions, unlike the anti-bribery sections, which apply to both "issuers
and domestic concerns”, apply only to "issuers" registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.77 Essentially, the 1977 Act required every issuer of registered securities to 1) make and
keep books, records, and accounts which accurately and fairly reflect, in reasonable detail,
transactions and dispositions of assets, and (2) devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting.78
Broad language initially caused confusion about the interpretation of the some of the
language used, so the U.S. Congress added clarifying details in 1988 amendments by deleting the
"reason to know" standard.79 Congress also clarified the corporation's responsibility to make a
"good faith effort" in the financial record-keeping and internal accounting controls of foreign
subsidiaries in which U.S. companies have a minority interest.80
The FCPA was again amended in 1998 to implement the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions.81 The 1998 amendments extended the FCPA's
jurisdiction beyond America's borders to allow greater enforcement efforts by U.S. prosecutors,

77

15 USCS § 78m . Any stock issuer, who engages in interstate commerce or whose securities are traded on a
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78
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§ 5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (1988) (requesting that the President develop an anti-bribery agreement "with member
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Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 5 non-signed OECD countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovenia) have signed the OECD Convention..
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increasing SEC and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) enforcement of the FCPA, and furthering the
U.S. goal of eradicating corruption in foreign business practices.82
Two main aspects of the FCPA’s Accounting provisions, in particular, serve as
competent models in preventing the type of corruption experienced in IMF lending. They are the
Record-keeping provisions and the Internal Control provisions.
1. Record-keeping
The first significant requirement of the accounting provisions requires all issuers to
“make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”83 This applies to all
payments of funds, and not just those that are material in the traditional financial meaning.84
Moreover, the “reasonable detail” requirement entails keeping a “level of detail and degree of
assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.”85
The misconduct that the record-keeping provisions seek to prevent includes: (i) the
failure to record illegal transactions; (ii) the falsification of records to conceal illegal
transactions; and (iii) the creation of records that are quantitatively accurate, but fail to specify
qualitative aspects of the transaction.86 These too are broadly defined, so as to implicate what
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15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). The 1998 Amendments, adding the OECD, look the same as those set forth in the
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may seem as merely isolated incidences of violations. This undoubtedly serves to heighten the
gravity of the measures involved.

2. Internal Controls
The FCPA’s Accounting provisions also require issuers to devise and maintain a system
of internal accounting controls that will provide “reasonable assurances” that all transactions are
properly authorized.87 The purpose of the internal controls provision is to ensure that issuers use
accepted methods of accounting when recording economic transactions or protecting assets.88
Specifically, the FCPA requires corporate accountability by making reasonable
assurances that, inter alia, transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or
specific authorization; transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other
criteria applicable to such statements, and to maintain accountability for assets; access to
company assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific
authorization; and the recorded accountability for assets is compared with existing assets at
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.89
The “reasonable detail” and “reasonable assurance” standards on record-keeping and
internal control were criticized by the business community as exacting overly stringent
constraints on their ability to conduct business. Subsequently, Congress adopted a “prudent
person” standard for the amount of disclosure required by the FCPA.90 The requirement has,
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therefore, developed a level of detail and degree of assurance in record-keeping that would
satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.91
In terms of enforcement, the SEC and the Justice Department share duties under the
FCPA, where the SEC prosecutes civil violations of the accounting and anti-bribery provisions
as applied to issuers, while the Department of Justice prosecutes civil violations by domestic
concerns.92 The Department of Justice, however, “has exclusive jurisdiction in regard to
criminal prosecutions, whether by a domestic concern or an issuer.”93
As it now stands, the FCPA requires companies to keep accurate records and maintain a
system of internal controls, and outlaws the practice of bribing foreign officials and other
categories of recipients for the purpose of obtaining a business benefit.94 Because of the FCPA’s
success in achieving the government’s aims, the U.S. has pressured other nations to institute
similar anti-corruption initiatives.95
3.

International Efforts at Adopting the FCPA

At the behest of the U.S., which encouraged the preventing of corruption globally, thirtyfive nations signed the OECD Convention in 1997, after a lengthy process that began three years
earlier.96 The Convention, like the FCPA, requires that all participating parties criminalize the
bribery of foreign officials, outline appropriate sanctions for violations, and agree to extradite
those charged with a bribery offense.97 Accounting and record-keeping provisions of the
Convention were similar to those adopted by the FCPA in its 1998 amendment, and Argentina, a
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non-OECD member, signed the document in 2001, but has yet to ratify it, although ratification is
expected in the near future.98
The Organization of American States (“OAS”) also adopted an anti-corruption regulation
in its Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, which criminalizes transnational bribery in
the Western Hemisphere.99 The OAS Convention seeks to “prevent, detect, punish and
eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions,” and targets both the bribe-giver and
the bribe-receiver, hence surpassing the prohibitions contained within the OECD Convention,
which merely targets the conduct of the bribe-givers.100
Like the OECD Convention, signatory nations are to maintain, “systems for registering
the income, assets and liabilities of persons who perform public functions in certain posts as
specified by law and, where appropriate, for making such registrations public.”101 Its provisions,
however, do not go as far as the FCPA’s in attempting to establish sound accounting principles
in foreign transactions.
Interestingly, both the OECD and OAS Conventions were modeled in part after the
FCPA, and “these multilateral organizations were able to take advantage of the successes and
failures of the original U.S. legislation and its amendments.” 102 As a signatory to both
Conventions, and having ratified the OAS Convention,103 Argentina is required to implement the
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proscribed measures. In practice, though, Argentina and its government has been unable to
properly address its issues of graft and corruption in its own government circles.
On a global scale, the United Nations recently sponsored an initiative to curtail corruption
in its U.N. Convention against Corruption.104 The agreement criminalizes bribery, money
laundering, and embezzlement of public funds, and requires countries to take steps to prevent
corruption. Over 95 countries have signed the new law.
The Convention, however, neither requires signatory countries to enact new anticorruption laws, nor does it mandate sanctions for violating the pact. Critics also note that the
Convention does not clearly define what it seeks to prevent, labeling it as anti-corruption
rhetoric. In essence, though it is difficult to measure the Convention’s impact at present, what is
clear is that without vigorous enforcement, investigation, or the ability to support genuine
compliance, the Convention’s authority will not reach the level of success that has resulted from
the FCPA.
Lastly, the World Bank105 has attempted to control fraud and corruption by evaluating
corruption levels when designing development assistance strategies and implementing aid
projects.106 In fact, the World Bank has established an independent audit program and expanded
personnel oversight of its procurement processes, initiating a multi-faceted program designed to
combat corruption in its funded projects, while helping nations to reduce internal corruption and
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supporting international anti-corruption programs.107 The World Bank’s steps in addressing the
corruption issue in its loan projects have well exceeded the efforts taken by the IMF at present.
The IMF would be wise to follow the World Bank’s lead in identifying corruption as a problem
that should be dealt with immediately and appropriately.
B. Incorporating the FCPA As IMF Lending Policy
“A legacy of the centralized style of government handed down by the conquistadors,
corruption has undermined Latin America’s potential for centuries.”108 This is common
knowledge to most governments and institutions of the world, and should have been known to
the IMF when it made the decision to provide financial assistance to Argentina. In fact, U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell bluntly urged Argentina in 2002, then the third largest economy
in Latin America, to address its institutional flaws and to discourage, inter alia, excess public
sector borrowing, politicized judicial systems, a lack of transparency in government activities,
and, ultimately, corruption.109 Although a signatory member of the OECD and OAS
Conventions, corruption’s roots run so deep in Argentina that many of its leaders are not willing
to abandon the spoils system, despite its evils, allowing illegal financial practices to continue
unchecked.110
The IMF did take a tough stance with Argentina throughout its renegotiations. The
IMF’s subsequent bailout, however, either because of its own institutional pressure, or from U.S.
insistence that it provide new money, confirmed that the IMF’s position on eradicating
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corruption was not solid. The IMF’s decision to lend shows that it is committed to neither any
meaningful policy change, nor to any credible promises of corruption reform in its debtor
nations.
Indeed, leading economists have demanded that detailed reports, audits, and opinions
covering IMF programs with debtor countries be published.111 Even though prolonged studies
and consultation with outside experts are not always possible in a rapidly developing crisis,
nonetheless, preserving better records of the process can serve as a foundation for assuring the
success of its programs and eventual repayment.112
For these reasons, the IMF itself should look to the FCPA as a model in forming its anticorruption standards, indeed using those principles as a condition to the loans themselves,
especially where borrower countries have not proven a capacity to harness corruption in their
own governments. The IMF’s current Guidelines, though at once acknowledging the problem of
government corruption, do nothing to guarantee that its funds will be used for stated purposes.
The FCPA’s record-keeping and internal controls provisions, without a doubt, include the
necessary language for the IMF to manage the path of its loaned funds. With a few changes, its
eventual implementation by the IMF will do much to stifle the corruption inherent in the
countries that seek its financial assistance.
For one, the applicable FCPA provisions apply to “issuers” of registered securities under
the SEC. In contrast, the IMF should apply its FCPA-like anti- corruption regulation to all
“receivers,” that is, to those individuals or organizations that receive funds flowing from the
initial disbursement by the IMF to the debtor country’s central bank.
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Moreover, the IMF should most certainly adopt the “reasonable detail” requirement of
the record-keeping provision. Here, individuals or organizations to which the government will
disburse IMF-originating funds to further the objectives of the loan assistance program, should
register with and provide information to the IMF, sufficient to satisfy “prudent IMF officials and
members” in the conduct of their own affairs. The benefit of this provision is the assurance that
receivers are documented and readily identifiable when funds are mismanaged or lost through
graft or corruption. It also lessens the opportunity to falsify records to conceal improper or
unauthorized activities.
Correspondingly, the IMF should also require receivers to devise and maintain a system
of internal accounting controls that will provide “reasonable assurances” that all transactions
concerning IMF-originating funds are properly authorized. The purpose of the internal controls
provision, like with the FCPA, is to ensure that receivers use accepted methods of accounting
when recording transactions or protecting assets.
This solidly establishes debtor accountability by making reasonable assurances that, inter
alia, transactions are executed in accordance with the IMF’s, and the debtor country’s, goals in
mind; transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and to maintain accountability for assets; access to IMF-originating assets is
permitted only in accordance with the debtor country’s general or specific authorization; and the
recorded accountability for IMF assets is compared with existing assets at reasonable intervals
and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
Technology can also be a valuable tool in combating corruption under and FCPA-like
model. Requiring the posting of receiver’s personal or organizational financial information on
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the web113 can support transparency, as the Internet gives more people unprecedented access to
information. In an interdependent, mutually reinforcing manner, technology-driven openness
and transparency can help to cement the success of IMF programs, and can even foster the
development of democratic institutions.114
The theme in adopting these FCPA-like approaches is to establish accountability, both in
the handling of IMF-originating funds to fulfill program goals, and to assure that IMF members
will receive repayment. Because of the enormous amounts of money that may be involved and
the numbers of people that may come in contact with this capital, however, some will criticize
this approach as impractical to enforce. Useful here, though, is the approach adopted by the
OECD Convention to provide for Mutual Legal Assistance.115
Nations like Argentina, though not entirely an emerging market, will find it difficult to
enforce the anti-corruption safeguards imposed by the IMF’s model policy. As a result, IMF
member countries, undoubtedly among the wealthiest in the world, should provide along with its
financial assistance programs the guarantee of providing mutual legal assistance in enforcing and
overseeing the proper maintenance of records and accounting practices as it concerns IMForiginating funds. In fact, it would behoove IMF member countries to do so in order to assure
themselves of repayment of these loans.
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Another criticism that will materialize against the IMF’s implementation of an FCPA-like
anti-corruption standard is that the IMF should not condition its financial assistance upon
arbitrary stipulations which will benefit more the IMF than the borrower country. To some,
however, the IMF already acts as a vehicle for leveraging foreign policy, notably that of the
U.S.116 Currently, the IMF limits debtor country flexibility by demanding the opening of
telecommunications and energy markets, impositions the U.S. is notorious for. In contrast, the
IMF should be pushing primarily for the eradication of corruption in debtor country markets, in
order for IMF members to more effectively compete economically in those debtor countries, and
to lessen the risk that debtor countries will need further financial assistance. The FCPA model
approach imposes conditions that will indubitably help all parties concerned in the long term.
As it stands, the IMF’s programs are difficult to judge objectively because of the lack of
transparency in the decision-making and implementation process.117 The IMF executive board
should consult with anti-corruption experts and make operations public so that objective
criticism and review can take place.118
Furthermore, the IMF frequently uses teams that have little or no experience with the
debtor country or its institutions.119 By practicing due diligence through monitoring of the
borrower country and submitting regular reports to the Board, 120 the risk of corruption as it
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concerns IMF-originating funds is minimized, and the success of an FCPA-like regulation is
further assured.121 In essence, the IMF should have its staff makes sure that receivers are aware
of and are complying with this policy.122
Insufficient regulation of corruption leads to irresponsibility in the public and private
sectors.123 When corruption is allowed to run amuck, the poor are left to pay for IMF bailouts
that often simply serve to enable wealthy investors to shuttle capital out of the country.124 Part of
the tragedy, though, is that the IMF and the United States do not practice what they preach.125
While the institution and its member countries vowed to combat corruption in places like
Argentina, they acted, rather, to open markets that had long been corroded by illegal practices.

IV.

Conclusion

An Argentine Mayor recently proclaimed that, “we’re trying to let light into
government’s dark corners.”126 People in Argentina learned long ago to expect the worst from
government, yet sophisticated entities like the IMF continue to pursue fool-hearty objectives
without adequately addressing issues of corruption.127
The IMF, as evidenced in its Articles of Agreement, was never meant to comprehensively
address corruption in its loans.128 This soft stance on corruption, as a result, plainly contributed
to Argentina’s financial decline, which will have the effect of reducing the flow of foreign
capital to Argentina in the near future.
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The IMF’s soft stance on corruption also poses several future problems. For one, it
confirms to the Argentine leadership that the IMF is unwilling to pursue substantial reforms in
corruption. This encourages further political corruption, making any significant reform
practically impossible. Consequently, by making reform unachievable, the IMF perpetuates
poverty and economic instability.
The IMF’s failure in Argentina also sends a message to the leaders of other borrower
countries negotiating with the IMF that issues of corruption reform will be passed on to
subsequent governments, so long as lucrative markets remain open for business. Yet, corruption
reform is the only way for countries to generate income on a permanent basis.
As a result, skepticism has grown about IMF and U.S. intentions in the region.129 This
has occurred because dominant Board members, the United States et al., in complete disregard of
government criminal activity, has pushed the IMF’s loan packages to Argentina, among others.
Accordingly, the world’s disaffected are increasingly making their voices heard.130 “People have
had it.”131 Essentially, the IMF has become a symbol of globalization, frustration, and overall
the sentiment that the government is not interested in the welfare of the people.132 In fact, in
Argentina, the poor and working class demand that the government not renew its debt-payment
agreement with the IMF.133
In contrast, the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has energized U.S. firms and
the U.S. government to pursue a level playing field in business and business transactions.134 As a
result of its success in the U.S., other governments and international organizations have also
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required accounting and transparency in connection with public procurement, and have taken
steps to strengthen civil society as well.135
Unfortunately, the problems inherent in developing an effective international anticorruption regime include the practice of corruption itself, which in some governments, has been
embedded for centuries.136 Notwithstanding, if it is to have any success in future financial
assistance programs, the IMF must confront the reality of the need to design and implement an
effective anti-corruption policy as a condition to its loan agreements.137 Indeed, the IMF would
be wise to adopt a model like the FCPA to avoid future disasters, as occurred in Argentina.
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